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Abstract 
Following other leading international securities markets, the Tokyo stock exchange [TSE] has 
adopted a publicly displayed but anonymous limit order book, and we ask: how is market quality 
affected? Accounting for fixed effects and endogeneity, we find increased volatility and higher 
order book depth at the best bid and ask prices, while total depth is not significantly impacted. This 
predicts more competitive order strategies in a trading system with anonymous orders but with 
more visible price levels. Spreads are found to be unaffected by the market design change, in 
contradiction to previous literature. Complementing the literature, we find volume increases, 
indicating that the aggregate effect of the design change is positive. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent trend in international securities markets has been to cease disclosing pre-trade broker 
identification and at the same time increase the visibility of the now anonymous order book.4 This 
paper investigates the impact of this common change in pre-trade transparency on market quality. 
This is an important question as the change in pre-trade transparency may affect market quality in 
several ways.  Anonymous trader identities may potentially have negative effects as the search for 
counterparties becomes more costly. The ability for brokers perceived as informed to remain 
anonymous may again have positive effects. A greater transparency of the depth of the order book 
is expected to have positive effect, as trades can be executed with greater accuracy when the exact 
volume on several price levels is known. In this paper we measure market quality as volatility, bid-
ask spreads, limit order book depth and volume as we investigate the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), 
the second largest stock market in the world by market capitalization and fourth by traded value up 
to 20095. The TSE ceased to display broker identity to exchange members in June 2003, and 
simultaneously increased the level of limit order book information by providing the three best bid- 
and ask-price levels and volumes to the public. This provides us with an excellent opportunity to 
study the impact on market quality of a common change in market design, and to do so using data 
                                                 
4 Rindi (2008 ) points out that almost all the asset markets organized as electronic platforms are anonymous: 
NYSE’s Open Book service shows the aggregate limit-order volume available in the NYSE Display Book 
system at each price point, but provides no identity of the participants behind these orders. The single 
platform for NASDAQ-listed securities (NASDAQ’s Integrated Single Book), into which the NASDAQ 
Market Center, Inet and Brut recently merged, is anonymous; all European trading platforms are anonymous, 
as well as all electronic communication networks and foreign exchange electronic markets (e.g., Electronic 
Broking System). The Nordic markets have a more complex history. On June 2nd, 2008, NASDAQ OMX 
Nordic introduced post-trade anonymity on the Helsinki market and the five most heavily traded shares in 
Stockholm, but in April 2009 the decision regarding Stockholm was reversed and ex-post transparency 
restored to all but the five largest Helsinki stocks that remain anonymous in real time. Broker identities are 
revealed at the close of trading. Anonymity was instituted in the Italian secondary market for treasury bonds 
(MTS) in 1997, in Euronext Paris in 2001, in Tokyo in 2003, in the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana) 
in 2004 and in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2005. The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange in Brazil, 
which provides pre-trade transparency, and the KRX in South Korea, which provides post-trade 
transparency, are the only markets bucking this trend. 
5 Surpassed in market capitalisation by London SE Group in 2009 and Nasdaq OMX in 2010, (NYSE 
Euronext remaining largest) and surpassed by Shanghai SE in traded value in 2007 (source World Federation 
of Stock Exchanges).  
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from a highly significant stock market that also represents a pure limit order book market rather 
than a hybrid of dealer- and order-driven markets. The studied change in market design is common 
for limit order book markets, while hybrid markets tend to provide some transparency of dealer 
identity. Although we recognize that the market design change investigated in this paper is 
complex, it is the design of choice for most limit order markets, and hence it is important to provide 
a more complete picture of the impact of such a common design change. In one previous study, 
where the 2003 market design change at TSE is included, Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica 
(2005 ) focus on the impact on spreads, which does not provide a complete picture of the impact of 
the market design change studied here. In addition, we contribute to the literature by addressing the 
endogeneity problem of previous empirical research that typically examines one statistic for market 
quality and uses several others as exogenous controls6.  
We use several alternative metrics for market quality, and methodology that accounts for 
fixed effects and endogeneity in the included statistics for market quality. We find that volatility 
increases after the TSE market design change. The depth of the limit order book increases at the 
best bid and ask prices while total depth is not significantly impacted. Accounting for the 
interaction between spreads, volatility and volume, we find that spreads are not affected by the 
design change. Previous literature does not consider the volume effects of transparency. In our 
paper, we find that volume increases as a result of the TSE design change, which is consistent with 
the higher volatility. 
2. Hypotheses based on the literature 
2.1 Price volatility 
                                                 
6 Some empirical work investigating the impact of transparency/opacity alteration begins by pointing out that 
the change alters trade volume and a variety of measures of volatility, effective and realized spread, 
depending on which variable the authors treat as the dependent variable. However, typically they treat the 
remaining market quality metrics as exogenous control variables with no attempt to construct instrumental 
variables or the use of Two Stage Least Squares. There is one notable exception in Eom, Ok and Park 
(2007), which examines the impact of expansions of the best bid and ask levels revealed to the public.  
4 
 
Madhavan (1996 ) concludes that “In a sufficiently large market transparency reduces volatility and 
improves market quality”. However, if the market is relatively thin, Madhavan (1996 ) 
demonstrates that “market transparency can actually increase price volatility and lower market 
liquidity. This occurs even though transparency increases the precision of traders’ predictions about 
the asset’s value”. Since volatility is essentially unobservable, several metrics for volatility have 
been developed, and hence it is important to measure the correct form of volatility. We expect 
measures less affected by market microstructure noise, such as range based volatility (see Alizadeh, 
Brandt and Diebold (2002 )), not to be impacted by changes in pre-trade transparency. We expect 
measures that include transitory volatility, such as realized volatility (see Andersen and Bollerslev 
(1997 )), to be significantly affected by changes in pre-trade transparency. The Fishman and 
Hagerty (1995 ) microstructure model can be applied in this context to show that broker 
identification anonymity results in increased intraday volatility and decreased trade volume. 
Informed traders do not have to disclose their intentions pre-trade, hence price discovery is delayed, 
causing higher volatility when information finally is impounded as the informed traders transact. 
The greater risk of trading with an informed trader makes uninformed traders cautious, resulting in 
lower trading volume. 
Hypothesis 1: In larger market capitalization segments with more participants, where there is 
a higher level of competition, increased transparency is expected to reduce volatility and lower 
transaction costs. In smaller market capitalization segments, increased transparency is expected to 
raise volatility and transaction costs. The change in market design investigated in this paper is 
expected to increase volatility due to the removal of counterparty identity while the increased level 
of depth information may neutralize or even dominate the effect on volatility, particularly in smaller 
market capitalization segments. 
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To address this hypothesis, we study and assess the statistical significance of changes in 
range-based volatility, realized volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote returns for market 
capitalization segments around the TSE change in market design. 
2.2 Quoted spreads 
Foucault, et al. (2007 ) propose a theoretical model where informed bidders exploit less informed 
market participants by bidding as if the cost of liquidity provision was large, when in fact it is 
small. This strategy is less effective when traders cannot distinguish between informative and 
uninformative limit orders. Hence, informed bidders act more competitively in an anonymous 
market where average quoted spreads decline significantly. Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003 ) 
also expect that allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads 
due to higher competition between market makers. 
Hypothesis 2: We expect to observe no significant change in quoted spreads in a market 
moves to anonymous broker IDs and simultaneously starts displaying more information about the 
depth of the limit order book.  The lower spreads as result of more competition between liquidity 
providers in an anonymous market may be neutralized by the simultaneous introduction of more 
depth transparency in our investigated market. To address this hypothesis, we study changes in 
closing, equally-weighted and time-weighted quoted spreads around the TSE event. 
2.3 Effective spreads  
While quoted spreads measure aggressiveness in the order placement strategy of traders, effective 
spreads measure actual paid transaction costs on executed trades. According to Madhavan (1996 ), 
in sufficiently large market capitalization segments, market transparency may reduce transaction 
costs. But from a perspective of a strategic trader, effective spread is strictly higher in a transparent 
market. Following Foucault, et al. (2007 ) anonymous quotes is expected to improve price 
competition between liquidity providers and narrow effective spreads. 
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Hypothesis 3: We expect to observe no significant change in effective spreads in a market that 
moved to anonymous broker IDs and simultaneously started displaying more information about the 
depth of the limit order book. The narrowing of effective spreads due to the switch to anonymous 
quotes may be neutralized by the simultaneous introduction of more depth transparency in our 
investigated market. The effects is expected to wary across segments of different liquidity following 
Madhavan (1996 ). To address this hypothesis we study and assess the statistical significance of 
changes in market-wide trade value-weighted effective spreads around the TSE event for the full 
sample and for market capitalization segmented sub-samples.  
2.4 Order book depth 
Foucault, et al. (2007 ) propose that informed bidders act more competitively in an anonymous 
market, which is expected to decrease the quoted depth. They find support for this proposal in their 
study of the effects of anonymization of broker ID on Euronext France. 
Hypothesis 4: We expect to observe decreased total LOB depth in a market with anonymous 
broker IDs, while the depth at the best bid and ask level is expected to increase due to more 
competitive informed bidders. To address this hypothesis, we study the depth in the limit order 
book at the available limit order book levels in the TSE.7 We analyze the average value at the best 
bid (ask) and at the three best levels in the order book, as well as best bid (ask) depth to total bid 
(ask) depth, before and after the TSE change in market design. 
2.5 Volume 
Rindi (2008 ) does not directly address the effects of transparency on volume, but her model 
predicts that pre-trade transparency will raise volatility and spreads. It is possible that the increased 
volatility leads to more trading even if trading is more expensive due to higher spreads. This 
counterintuitive result, observable in Comerton-Forde, et al. (2005 ), who report volume effects for 
                                                 
7 Tokyo stock exchange displayed three levels of the order book to the public prior to June 2003, then they 
started displaying the five best levels after June 2003. 
7 
 
Euronext, Tokyo and Korea, is plausible if the narrower spreads are a result of more aggressive 
orders in a transparent market. Empirical support is found in Duong, Kalev and Krishnamurti 
(2009 ), who find that in Australia, traders posted more aggressive orders during a previous regime 
with visible broker IDs, as opposed to the current opaque policy. Studies comparing turnover rates 
and volatility of international markets also show that the world’s largest markets with the highest 
turnover rates are also the most volatile markets.  
Applying Kyle (1985 ), and more explicitly Rindi (2008 ), changes in transparency should 
impact the interaction of informed traders with liquidity or noise traders. In a transparent regime 
informed trading is less profitable, leading to a decrease in the number of traders that become 
informed. Traders that are informed will trade more aggressively, timing their trades to periods 
when there are more liquidity traders present. In sufficiently large market segments where the 
number of liquidity traders is inherently greater, more aggressive informed traders may lead to 
higher traded volume and more rapid dissemination of this information. In smaller market segments 
with fewer liquidity traders and a diminishing number of agents that have the incentive to become 
informed, traded volumes may be less affected or fall. 
Hypothesis 5: We expect to observe lower traded volume in a market with anonymous broker 
IDs. This effect is expected to be strongest for large stocks and may weaken or reverse for smaller 
capitalization market segments. The simultaneous introduction of more depth transparency in our 
investigated market may neutralize the effects of anonymous broker IDs and in fact increase traded 
volume due to faster and greater order execution accuracy in a visible LOB. We investigate the 
volume effects around the TSE market design change. 
3. Institutional details 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange uses an electronic, continuous auction order-driven trading 
system. This means that brokers place orders in an online system and when a buy and sell price 
match, the trade is automatically executed. Transactions are hence made directly between buyer and 
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seller, rather than through a market maker. The TSE uses price controls so that the price of a stock 
cannot rise or fall below a certain point throughout the day. These controls are used to prevent 
dramatic swings in prices. If a major change in price occurs, the exchange can halt trading in that 
stock for a specified period of time. Orders are hence subjected to a daily price variation range. 
(Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2003 )). 
The TSE offers two trading sessions each weekday, from 09:00 to 11:00 and from 12:30 to 
15:00: the morning and afternoon sessions, respectively. The first transactions of each session, 
which start at 8:00 and 12:05, are executed during the ‘opening auction’ at the start of each session, 
and the last transactions are executed during the ‘closing auction’ at the end of each session. Thus 
there are two opening and two closing auctions each day. The opening and closing prices are 
determined by call auctions, called ‘Itayose’. Once the opening prices have been determined, a 
continuous auction commences, called ‘Zaraba’. During this continuous trading session, each order 
is matched individually to other orders during the rest of the trading session. 
On June 30, 2003, the TSE discontinued displaying the identity of brokers for limit orders to 
their exchange members. On the same date the five best bid- and ask-price levels and volumes were 
made available to the public. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data  
The initial dataset includes all constituents of Nikkei 2258 during the period from March 1, 2003 to 
September 30, 2003. We eliminate stocks that have non-trading periods per day during the sample 
period. Of the 175 stocks that met our criteria, we have access to the limit order book (LOB) data of 
99 stocks; this is necessary for our analysis of book depth. As a result, our final dataset includes 
intraday trade and quote data for the 99 stocks, with associated prices, volumes, and bid and ask 
sizes. The history of the LOB available for 99 stocks contains the best available price levels, 
                                                 
8 We choose Nikkei 255 which is a widely followed index designed to reflect the complete Japanese Market. 
9 
 
including the total number of shares demanded and offered at each level. Specifically, we obtain the 
displayed three best bid/ask prices and volumes in the LOB before June 30, 2003 and the five best 
bid/ask prices after this date. The intraday data are provided by Thomson Reuters Tick History 
(TRTH) through the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The market 
capitalization data are obtained from the Thomson Reuters DataStream. The data from Thomson 
Reuters is verified using a database maintained by Nikkei, Tokyo, Japan. 
4.2 Methodology 
We examine the changes in market quality variables around the event date, dividing the sample into 
a pre- and post-period around the event date. Consistent with Madhavan, Porter and Weaver 
(2005 ), we eliminate the month of the event to avoid possible biases from proximity to the event. 
The pre-period is March 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003 and the post period is July 1, 2003 to September 
30, 2003. Aiming to determine the different impacts on various market segments, we split the 
sample into five groups by market capitalization on January 2, 2003 – the first trading day of the 
same year.  
We examine the changes in three measures of volatility – realized volatility, daily range-based 
volatility and standard deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices – and a range of spread 
measures. Realized volatility is calculated by using the mid-quote every five minutes during the 
trading day to avoid bid-ask bounce, then squaring each of these returns, and summing them up for 
the trading day9. In Section 3.1 we discussed the expected differences in impacts of transparency on 
these statistics. Consistent with Madhavan, et al. (2005 ), transaction cost is measured both as 
traded value-weighted effective percentage spread, and spread in yen. The yen effective spread is 
the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the mid-point price in the LOB 
when the trade is executed. The effective percentage spread is the effective spread in yen scaled by 
the prevailing mid-point price in the LOB when the trade is executed. Consistent with Madhavan, et 
                                                 
9 All of the variables are stationary: see details in Appendix. 
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al. (2005 ), we use the average time-weighted quoted spread in percentage and market depth to 
capture market liquidity. For robustness, we examine the percentage closing spread and equally-
weighted quoted spread to determine the impact of the events on the cost of demanding immediate 
execution (Demsetz (1968 )). We calculate relative closing spread as the closing spread in dollar 
terms divided by the midpoint price where close values are recorded at the end of the trading day. 
We use eight depth measures, including the volume at the best bid and ask; the total volume at the 
three best levels; and the fraction on best ask and bid versus all visible orders to buy and sell, both 
by size and traded value. All of these proxies are calculated in intraday data and averaged across 
daily to produce one observation per stock per day. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used in our univariate tests to examine the differences in 
medians for each proxy.  
In all multivariate analyses, we use log transformations of volatility, bid-ask spreads, depths 
and volume metrics to derive a log-linear relationship with other variables in the regressions. We 
implement the same regressions of each measure on the full sample and the five individual 
quintiles.  Following Foucault and Menkveld (2008 ), total depth is measured by consolidated depth 
at a certain price (i.e., the sum of all shares available at that price or better). A time trend variable is 
included in all our regressions in order to capture daily changes in the dependent variable holding 
all other explanatory variables constant, and to prevent the possibility that our findings on design 
changes are simply due to trends. The time trend variable begins with a value of 1 and increases by 
1 unit for each investigated day. In our unbalanced panel data, we expect the estimated time effect 
would represent the time effects for all the proxies of market quality. 
5. Results 
5.1 Changes in price volatility 
5.1.1 Univariate tests 
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We provide three statistics for volatility, including logarithm of high-low price, realized volatility 
and standard deviation in the midpoint price measured every 15 minutes. Following Hendershott 
and Jones (2005 ), we use the daily difference between the logarithm of highest and lowest 
transaction price as the first volatility metric, denoted ln_ _hi lo . 
<INSERT Table 1 here> 
Table 1 presents the difference in volatility metrics between pre- and post-periods and reveals 
a quite small but highly significant increase in all three volatility proxies for the full sample. 
Examining the adjustments for historical volatility and standard deviation in each size quintile also 
reveals results consistent with that hypothesis. The change in the high-low volatility is significant 
only for the smallest quintile. Realized volatility increased significantly in all of the market 
capitalization segments. Based on these results, we conclude that the market design change of the 
TSE in 2003 does affect price volatility in the univariate setting. 
5.1.2 Multivariate regressions 
We estimate a regression in which volatility depends on control variables, including the number of 
trades and the TSE total depth, in order to capture the effect of extension of the public LOB on 
volatility. Madhavan, et al. (2005 ) document evidence of the impact of the opening of LOB on 
volatility in the Toronto Stock Exchange. Following Foucault, et al. (2007 ), we apply a stock fixed 
effect approach to control for some of the heterogeneity across stocks. We extend the model of 
Madhavan, et al. (2005 ) to control for the relationship between price volatility and trading 
frequency: 
1 2   _     ,it it it it it it itVola Num Trade Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β γ β ε= + + + + +      (1) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVola represents three measurements of volatility, including range-
based volatility, realized volatility and standard deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices; 
itDummy is the dummy variable for broker ID opacity taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design 
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change and 1 after the event; itTrend is the time variable; _ itNum trade is daily number of trades; 
itTotalDepthVal is the daily average of total depth in yen; and itα represents 1n −  stock fixed 
dummies in which n is the number of the sample stocks. 
5.1.2.1 Fixed effect OLS results 
First, we use Ordinary Least Squares with fixed effect to estimate coefficients in the model. The 
first three columns of Table 2 report the coefficients for β1 as 0.0122, 0.0444 and 0.597, all 
statistically significant, which reinforces the positive relationship between trade frequency and the 
three metrics of volatility, as shown in the literature. The coefficient of the number of trades 
variable is highly significant, implying that an increase in the number of trades is associated with an 
increase in intra-day volatility. The negatively significant coefficients of the time trend variable in 
range-based range volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote prices in the regressions suggest 
that volatility trends down over time. 
<INSERT Table 2 here> 
The positively significant coefficient of the broker dummy variable suggests broker ID 
anonymity may lead to an increase in the volatility of stock prices. To separate the mutual effects of 
simultaneous events, a market depth variable (measured in yen) is included in the regression, and 
this result is presented in Table 2. Negative coefficients of the log of total depth in yen for the 
range-based range and standard deviation of mid-quote prices measures are significant at 0.1 per 
cent, showing that changes in market depth may adjust volatility in the opposite direction.  
5.1.2.2 Fixed effects two stage least squares results: Full sample 
Foucault, et al. (2007 ) confirm in their univariate analysis that volatility co-moves with a variety of 
other variables, such as the number of trades, when opacity is introduced. Thus, we implement a 
two-stage least-squares model with stock fixed effect approach using the number of trades and total 
value of order depth as endogenous variables, while the first and second lags of the dependent 
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variable, time trend and logarithm of market capitalization are instruments. These are valid 
instruments, as they are either predetermined or explicitly exogenous.  
The validity of these predetermined and exogenous variables in the equation system are 
examined by conducting over-identification tests. We use Basmann (1960 ) approach provided in 
the statistical package SAS to test for over-identifying restrictions and use the F-statistic for an 
over-identification test. For a majority of our models, the over-identification tests are not 
statistically significant; thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no over-identification. In those 
cases where the F-statistics are high enough to reject the null hypothesis, almost all our results 
remain when we omit the two predetermined variables of market value and relative tick size. These 
test results suggest that there is no strong evidence against the validity of the instrumental variables 
in our models. 
The results of these estimations, presented in the last three columns of Table 2, strengthen the 
findings of prior literature regarding the association between the number of trades and volatility. 
Correcting endogenous characteristics in the models emphasizes the negative effect of the time 
trend variable on volatility at the 5 per cent and 0.1 per cent significance levels for all stock 
exchanges. We also find a negatively significant relationship between the logarithm of volatility 
(apart from realized volatility) and the logarithm of total depth by value under the new market 
design. 
All of the three volatility metrics are significantly positively related to anonymity and a higher 
level of the depth display in all three model specifications. We observe that the dummy coefficients 
of realized volatility and standard deviation over fifteen minutes are 0.0856 and 0.2136, 
respectively, which is higher than the coefficient of range-based volatility of 0.002185. These 
figures imply that the effect of the simultaneously conflicting events on the logarithm of high-low 
volatility is similar to the impact on the two other measures; however, the realized volatility and 
intra-day standard deviation are more positively affected, suggesting that the slower price discovery 
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caused by removal of counterparty identity has been offset by the faster order execution caused by 
the extension of the LOB. 
5.1.2.3 Fixed effect two stage least squares results: Individual quintiles 
To examine the effect of contrasting changes in the LOB on different market segments, we 
implement the two-stage least squares with fixed effect approach on five individual quintiles, 
reported in Table 3. The table presents the stock fixed effect results of 2SLS regressions on five 
quintiles for three volatility metrics in Panels 1, 2 and 3, respectively. T-statistics are stated in 
brackets under the coefficients of each control variable with significance levels. 
<INSERT Table 3 here> 
The coefficient β1 for range-based volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote prices is 
positive and highly significant at the 0.1 per cent level for all capitalization quintiles. We observe a 
similar pattern for coefficient β2 for the time trend variable. The same result is observable for 
realized volatility only for the second largest quintile. Coefficients of the opacity dummy variable β 
are significant and positive only for the two quintiles with the smallest market capitalization stocks 
in the range-based volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote prices. These increases in 
volatility in the smallest stocks by market capitalization may result from faster information 
dissemination following the extension of the LOB price level and order size visibility, showing 
greater trade aggressiveness for this segment. These outcomes suggest that minor stocks are more 
sensitive to greater visibility of the LOB price levels than they are to anonymous broker IDs. This 
does not hold for major market capitalization stocks. For larger market capitalization segments, 
trading no longer sufficiently incorporates private information due to anonymity, which neutralizes 
the combined effect of removal of broker identity and more visible LOB price levels, leading to no 
clear changes in volatility in these stocks. These results are in line with our Hypothesis 1. 
5.2 Changes in spreads  
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5.2.1 Univariate tests 
Following the literature, we analyze spreads to measure the immediate transaction cost dimension 
of market quality. Trade-value-weighted effective spreads in local currency and percentage act as 
our transaction cost metrics. Panels 1, 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the changes in quoted spreads for the 
full sample and for the five size quintiles. 
<INSERT table 4 here> 
Consistent with Foucault, et al. (2007 ), Tokyo has narrower quoted spreads after 
discontinuing the dissemination of the broker information when examining all stocks and each 
quintile. Although we observe quite small differences in percentage measures between the two 
periods, most of these results are statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. We also observe a 
larger decline in quoted spreads for the smaller market capitalization market segments. The 
reduction in equal-weighted and time-weighted quoted spreads is 0.00084 per cent and 0.00195 per 
cent, respectively, for the TSE smallest quintiles, and these figures present a gradual downward 
trend to 0.00011 and 0.00036 for the TSE largest quintile. A robustness check using closing spread 
provides additional evidence of a decrease in quoted spread during the post-period: it falls by 
0.00036 per cent for the full sample, at a 0.1 per cent significance level. The highest reduction 
occurs in the lowest market capitalization group, with approximately 0.00097 per cent, while there 
is no significant evidence of a decrease in closing spread for the highest market capitalization 
group. 
Panels 4 and 5 in Table 4 show that, for the full sample and five size quintiles, there is a 
significant change in effective spread in percentage terms. Panel 5 in this table shows the 
statistically narrower spread in the TSE after the change in market design. In order to separate the 
impact of volatility on effective spread, we estimate a regression model in the next section. 
5.2.2 Multivariate regression 
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Previous research suggests that there are at least three variables influencing bid-ask spreads: trading 
volume, price and variance of return. Moreover, Madhavan, et al. (2005 ) find that the opening of 
LOB to the public affected quoted and effective spreads on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Thus, we 
estimate a regression in which the width of the spread depends on control variables, including 
volatility, trading volume, time trend and total depth: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it it itSpd Vol Vola Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β γ β ε= + + + + + +   (2) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itSpd is either the quoted spread or the effective spread in 
percentage and local currency; itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the time 
variable; itDummy is the dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE 
design change and 1 after the event; and itTotalDepthVal is the daily average of total depth in yen. 
We would expect to find β  to be significantly different from zero, which provides evidence that the 
investigated event affects spreads. 
5.2.2.1 Fixed effect OLS results 
The first four columns in Table 5 present the results of the fixed effect OLS regression for four 
spread models. Our results are consistent with previous literature showing that spreads are 
negatively related to volume. Our regressions also confirm the positive association between the 
dependent variable and volatility. This table indicates a significant coefficient of the dummy 
variable in percentage terms pre- and post-introduction of the identity of brokers, but in 
controversial directions. The positive coefficient of percentage measures of quoted spread implies 
that, after controlling for other factors influencing spreads, the market design change causes an 
increase in the logarithm of quoted spread. These findings contradict our previous inferences from 
the univariate tests that the two mixing events may lead to narrower quoted spreads. However, the 
dummy coefficient in the percentage bid-ask effective spread model demonstrates the reverse. 
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Similarly, for volatility, it is very likely that spread, volatility and volume are endogenous variables 
justifying the two stage least squares regression model we apply in the following section. 
<INSERT Table 5 here> 
5.2.2.2 Fixed effect 2SLS results: Full sample 
We estimate the two stage least squares regression with a stock fixed effect specification for four 
measures of spreads, in which volume, volatility and total depth are used as endogenous variables, 
while the first two lagged dependent variables, time trend, log of market capitalization and the 
logarithm of relative tick size are used as instruments. We conduct a similar over-identification test 
as in Section 5.1.2.2, and cannot reject the null hypothesis of no over-identification. 
We find that the total depth variable is positively related to both percentage spread measures. 
Accounting for the endogeneity problem also clarifies the contentious results in the fixed effect 
OLS regressions. As such, all diverse coefficients of dummy variables in spreads are insignificant, 
as shown in the last four columns of Table 5. While our OLS results are consistent with Comerton-
Forde, et al. (2005 ), our fixed effect 2SLS implies that the concurrent changes in LOB does not 
have any direct effect in Tokyo when the effects of volatility, time trend, volume and depth are 
accounted for. 
5.2.2.3 Fixed effect 2SLS results: Individual quintiles 
We implement the fixed effect 2SLS regressions for individual quintiles on four spread models. As 
for the full sample, volume, volatility and total depth are treated as endogenous variables, while the 
first and second lagged dependent variables, time trend, log of market capitalization and the 
logarithm of relative tick size are used as instruments. The estimated coefficients are reported in 
Table 6 including t-statistics below each coefficient.  
<INSERT Table 6 here> 
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The dummy coefficients for quintile 1 are approximately 0.06 to 0.088 and significant for 
dollar effective spread and both measurements of quoted spreads. We do not observe any evidence 
of changes in the percentage effective spread as well as in other spread models for larger stocks. 
The outcome indicates the smallest stocks with less liquidity are most affected and are traded more 
aggressively in an anonymous environment, conditional on traders having access to greater 
information on the bid and ask price levels. The results also are consistent with higher volatility for 
this market segment in the post market design change environment. The combined effect of removal 
of broker identity and more visible LOB price levels has in aggregate no effect on quoted spreads 
and effective spread in line with our Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
5.3 Changes in limit order book depth  
5.3.1 Univariate tests 
Following Foucault and Menkveld (2008 ), we compute the consolidated depth at all (available) 
levels as total depths; that is, the total number of shares of three best buy and sell quotes in the LOB 
at the end of each interval. These metrics include three best price levels of depth throughout the 
sample period to obtain comparable results (while the exchange starts displaying five levels of 
depth during the second half of the period). 
<INSERT Table 7 here> 
Generally we do not find significant changes in depth measured by the number of shares, as 
shown in Panels 1, 2, and 4 in Table 7. Panel 1 shows there is a significant decline in depth for the 
smallest stock category at-best level. However, the depths measured in yen indicate the opposite 
results in Panels 5 and 6. These increases in both average best depth and total depth in yen suggest 
that overall depth increases after the TSE market design change. 
Panels 3 and 7, and 4 and 8, in Table 7 present changes in the ratio bid depth and ask depth by 
volume and by value, respectively, around the June, 2003 event. According to these panels, we find 
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that best bid depth versus total depth weakens both by volume and by value for the medium-size 
stocks and for the full sample. We observe no change in the ratio between best ask depth and total 
ask depth, either by size or by value (see Panels 4 and 8). A slight reduction in the ratio of the best 
bid size indicates bidders’ diminishing capability to forecast trade flows in the anonymous 
environment although they can perceive greater bid and ask levels in the limit order book. 
5.3.2 Multivariate regression 
Following O'Hara (1995 ), the change of the depth of  the LOB can be explained by trading volume 
and price volatility. It is important to control for changes in these variables to ensure that any 
changes in depth observed in this study are attributable to the change in transparency, and not 
merely to changes in market conditions that influence these variables (Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic and 
Johnstone (2006 )). We estimate Equation (3) to test the impact of changed pre-trade transparency 
on market depth, controlling for possible changes in known determinants: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it itDepthVal LogVol Vola Trend Dummyα β β β β ε= + + + + +             (3) 
 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the 
time variable; itDummy is a dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the 
TSE design change and 1 after the event; and itDepthVal is the daily average of total depth and the 
best depth in yen. 
5.3.2.1 Fixed effect OLS results 
We estimate the model using OLS with stock fixed effect regression and, as for all of the above 
equations, we take the logarithm of all explanatory and dependent variables (except for the time 
trend variable). Table 8 reports the results of regression analysis of depth against the explanatory 
variables: volume, volatility, time trend and a dummy variable for the change in LOB transparency. 
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The results of the regression analysis can be used to determine the effects of the change in pre-trade 
transparency after controlling for changes in volume, volatility and daily trend.  
<INSERT Table 8 here> 
Consistent with O'Hara (1995 ) and Bortoli, et al. (2006 ), we find a positive and statistically 
significant association between the total depth in yen and the trading volume, and a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the total depth in yen and volatility. Both measured 
depths reflect an uptrend over time, proved by positively significant coefficients of time trend for 
all regressions. The changes in market protocol in Tokyo have a positive impact on these market 
depths in the OLS specification, significant for both the log of best depth and the log of total depth. 
It is important to note that, concurrent with the move to opaque broker IDs, the TSE increased the 
transparency in the LOB from three best price levels to five best price levels. Hence, any changes in 
the depth in the estimation are impacted by two events. 
5.3.2.2 Fixed effect 2SLS results 
We estimate a two stage least-squares regression with stock fixed effect specification as expressed 
in Equation 3. Two determinants named volume and volatility are treated as endogenous variables, 
while the first lagged dependent variable, time trend, and logarithm of market capitalization are 
used as instruments. The results for the full sample are reported in the last two columns of Table 8. 
Our outcomes on the relationship between depths and log of volume as well volatility are consistent 
with O'Hara (1995 ) and Bortoli, et al. (2006 ), and in line with the OLS results. However, after 
controlling the endogeneity of explanatory variables, we find that only the coefficient of dummy 
variable in Log of the best depth model is significant and positive. This implies that the TSE market 
design change has a positive impact on the best depth, not on the total market depth. 
Similar regressions are implemented for individual quintiles and are reported in Table 9. We 
document the positive association between the logarithm of depth in yen and that of trading volume 
and volatility at a significance of 0.1 per cent. Interestingly, in contrast to the OLS results, the 
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variation of all the investigated depths is proved to decline over time after controlling for the 
instruments. Neither is the negative coefficient of the broker ID dummy in the total depth regression 
significant. This result implies that the change in total depth may be caused by determinants of 
volume and volatility, as well as the extension of the LOB in the TSE, and not by the market design 
change event. However, the coefficient of the logarithm of the best market depth in yen is positive 
and significant at 0.1 per cent, as in the 2SLS model. 
<INSERT Table 9 here> 
Our results show that there is an increase in the depth at the best bid and ask as a result of the 
combined effect of removal of broker identity and more visible LOB price levels, but the impact on 
the aggregate depth is weak. Our results for individual regressions are consistent with that of the 
full sample, showing significant evidence of a deeper best depth after the event, and no changes in 
the total depth in the post-period. This is in line with previous research that shows that there are 
more orders on the best levels in a market with opaque broker IDs, due to less aggressive order 
placement: see Duong, et al. (2009 ). Our results are in line with hypothesis 4. 
5.4 Changes in volume 
Finally, univariate and multivariate tests for the effect of volume are performed. Although largely 
ignored by the literature, the volume effects should be of utmost importance for any exchange 
considering design policy, as the volume of trading is not only a sign of a well-functioning market 
but also the main source of revenue for an exchange. We estimate the following equation: 
1 , 1 2 3 4 5       ,     it it i t it it it it it it itVol Vol Spd Vola Mcap Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β β β γ β ε−= + + + + + + + +
  
           (4) 
In the two stage least-squares regression, we drop the first lag variable Volt-1 in the 
regression as we use three lags of volume as instruments. We also exclude the logarithm of market 
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capitalization variable in the main equation in the 2SLS, as this variable is utilized as instrumental 
variable. 
Table 10 presents trading volume prior- and post-event as well as any statistical changes 
following the introduction of opacity and higher LOB transparency for five quintiles and the full 
sample. All indicators are significantly positive, suggesting the number of shares traded rises in the 
post-period. Further, we find that this impact is the greatest for the smallest stocks. 
<INSERT Table 10 here> 
Our outcome for the OLS and 2SLS with fixed effect specification reported in Table 11 for 
the full sample is in line with the univariate analysis. The broker ID opacity dummy coefficient is 
0.03 in the OLS, and 0.06 in the 2SLS estimation, significant at the 5 per cent and 0.1 per cent 
level, respectively, which confirms a significant increase in trading volume in the post-period. 
<INSERT Table 11 here> 
We do not find significant evidence for this upward direction of trading volume in regressions 
for individual quintiles. The dummy coefficients are not significant for individual size quintiles, 
implying that the volume results are quite sensitive to the chosen sample and that large stocks 
dominate in the full sample analysis; see Table 12. The combined effect of removal of broker 
identity and more visible LOB price levels increases trading volume in line with Hypothesis 5. 
<INSERT Table 12 here> 
5.5 Robustness check 
Since the policy in this paper affects all stocks at the same time, the error terms in our regressions 
using Equations (1) – (4) may be contemporaneously correlated across stocks. To address this 
potential problem, we include separate dummy variables for each day of the Post-Period, as in 
Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005 ). We also include a dummy variable for each stock to allow for 
stock-fixed effect, as in Foucault, et al. (2007 ) and we estimate the following equation of all 
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proxies of volatility, effective and quoted spreads, depths and traded volume for all the stocks in our 
sample: 
1 1
_    ,  
n m
k j
it k it j it it
k j
Mkt Quality Intercept Post period ControlVariableβ θ ε
= =
= + − + +∑ ∑ (5) 
where 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 are the three measures of volatility - range-based volatility; realized 
volatility; and standard deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices; the two relative spread 
metrics10 – effective and quoted spreads; the two depth measurements – the daily average of total 
depth and the best depth in yen; and daily traded volume, respectively. The dummy variables 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑘  equal one for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ day in the n-day post-event period and is zero otherwise. 
This results in 63 coefficients of the daily post-period dummy variables. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑗  is the 
same set of m control variables used in Equations (1), (2),  (3) and (4)  for analysis of volatility, 
spreads, depths and trading volume, respectively. We allow for the stock-fixed effect intercept. 
Table 13 reports the median of the coefficients of the post-period dummy variables (𝛽𝑘𝑠) and the 
𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (in parentheses) of the Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of a zero 
median. 
<INSERT Table 13 here> 
Testing the median of the 63 post-period dummy variables against zero provides the robust 
tests for our findings in the above sections. Panel A of table 13 shows all of the three volatility 
proxies increase significantly after the TSE events as we found in the regression of Equation (1). 
Panel B of the table indicates that the policy change does not affect both of the average of effective 
and quote spread across the stocks, even when we take into account for the potential problem of 
cross-correlated residuals. Panel C displays evidence supporting one of the two of our results in the 
regression of Equation (3), which shows a significant increase in the best depth. Panel D presents 
the results of the trading volume analysis with the daily time-series specification in Equation (5). 
                                                 
10 Since our sample includes a wide range of stocks, the relative measures of spreads would be more accurate 
than the absolute measures due to its comparability among stocks. Thus, we report the robustness tests for 
the two relative, not absolute measures of spreads. 
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Here, there is a highly significant increase in trading volume in the post-period. In summary, our 
findings on how volatility, spreads, best depth and traded volume are affected by the TSE market 
design change are robust to the potential cross-correlation across stocks. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We investigate the impact of a common change to pre-trade transparency on market quality. Many 
exchanges have recently ended disclosure of broker identification and, over time, increased the 
levels of price and volume displayed from the limit order book. Effectively this is the market 
structure that NYSE-Euronext, Nasdaq, Nasdaq-OMX, most European exchanges and Australia 
have moved to. We measure the effect of the introduction of this policy on volatility, transaction 
costs, LOB depth and traded volume in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Foucault, et al. (2007 ) 
confirm that volatility co-moves with a variety of other variables, such as the number of trades, 
when opacity is introduced. Further, there were two conflicting events taking effect simultaneously 
in the TSE, which may cause ambiguous effects on liquidity and order aggressiveness. This is why 
we implement a two-stage least-squares model with fixed stock effects to examine the impact of the 
change in pre-trade transparency at the TSE. 
We find that volatility increases after the TSE market design change which we attribute to a 
slower adjustment to new information when transaction counterparties are unknown. The depth of 
the limit order book increases at the best bid and ask prices while total depth is not significantly 
impacted. This supports earlier studies in the literature that predict an increase in depth as a result of 
more competitive order strategies in an opaque system. Our results also confirm findings in earlier 
studies that an increase in reported LOB depth is associated with a greater depth of the LOB. 
Accounting for the interaction between spreads, volatility and volume, we find that spreads are not 
affected by the TSE market design change, which is in contradiction to results in previous literature. 
We show this to be an expected result of the combined effect of the removal of broker identity and 
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more visible LOB price and order size information. Previous literature largely ignores the volume 
impacts of transparency altering market design changes. We find that volume increases as a result 
of the TSE market design change, which is consistent with the higher volatility. Overall, we 
conclude that the TSE market design change increases the welfare of traders, as it promotes higher 
traded volume, the most important indicator of gains from trade within a trading system.  
Interestingly, we find that the general combined effect of the removal of broker identity and 
more visible LOB price and order size information is greater for smaller stocks and close to neutral 
for larger stocks. As institutional traders that benefit most from anonymous broker IDs are active 
mainly in large stocks, it appears that the market design change has not affected large stocks 
negatively, while it has some positive effects on smaller stocks. Displaying more information about 
orders in the LOB, albeit anonymously, has previously been shown to improve liquidity (Boehmer, 
et al. (2005 )). The good news is that while the search for counterparties becomes more costly when 
broker IDs are anonymous, in the Tokyo case, the benefits from a more transparent LOB appear to 
outweigh any negative effects. 
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Table 1: Univariate Analysis for Volatility 
The table reports a summary of changes in median volatility for the full sample and five market 
capitalization quintile sub-samples. The Pre-Period is March 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003 and the Post-Period is 
July 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003. ‘Difference’ rows report the change from the pre-period to post-period 
in three volatility metrics: _ _Ln hi lo , which is range-based volatility; realized volatility; and standard 
deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices. A signed-rank Wilcoxon test examines whether medians 
change significantly after the removal of broker IDs and extension of the LOB. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Ln_hi_lo Realized 
Volatility 
Standard 
deviation 15 
mins 
Quintile 1 (smallest) 
Pre-Period 0.02 38.357 8.408 
Post-Period 0.021 42.614 11.617 
Difference 0.001*** 4.257*** 3.209*** 
Quintile 2 
Pre-Period 0.01777 43.717 15.416 
Post-Period 0.01828 47.004 20.321 
Difference 0.001 3.287*** 4.905*** 
Quintile 3 
Pre Period 0.01687 46.507 17.019 
Post-Period 0.01713 49.116 21.593 
Difference 0.00026 2.609*** 4.574* 
Quintile 4 
Pre-Period 0.01662 50.224 17.846 
Post-Period 0.01685 53.201 23.265 
Difference 0.00023 2.977*** 5.419** 
Quintile 5 (largest) 
Pre-Period 0.01472 58.806 28.02 
Post-Period 0.01528 61.663 37.337 
Difference 0.001 2.857*** 9.317** 
Full Sample 
Pre-Period 0.017 47.548 20.055 
Post-Period 0.018 50.751 22.772 
Difference 0.001** 3.203*** 2.717*** 
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Table 2: Multivariate Analysis for Volatility: Full Sample 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2   _     ,it it it it it it itVola Num Trade Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β γ β ε= + + + + +  (1) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVola represents three measurements of volatility including range-based 
volatility, realized volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote prices every fifteen minutes; itDummy is a 
dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design change and 1 after the 
event; itTrend is the time variable; _ itNum trade is daily number of trade; and itTotalDepthVal is the daily 
average of total depth in yen. The table contains the stock fixed effect results of OLS and 2SLS regression 
for the full sample with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, the number of trades and total depth 
in yen are treated as endogenous variables, while the first and second lagged dependent variables, trend and 
log of market capitalization, are used as instruments. **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 
0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Fixed effect OLS regression Fixed effect 2SLS regression 
Ln_hi_lo 
Log of 
Realized 
Volatility 
Log of 
Standard 
deviation 15’ 
Ln_hi_lo 
Log of 
Realized 
Volatility 
Log of 
Standard 
deviation 15’ 
Log of Number of 
trades 
0.0122 0.0444 0.5973 0.0164 0.4192 2.518 
(56.82)*** (2.48)* (36.79)*** (19.00)*** (4.34)*** (21.97)*** 
Log of Total Depth 
in Yen 
-0.0052 0.0082 -0.0718 -0.004 0.0513 -0.6899 
(30.07)*** -0.57 (5.56) *** (16.38)*** -1.87 (21.21)*** 
Trend 
-0.000042 0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0053 
(10.85)*** -0.76 (9.15) *** (14.41) *** (2.04)* (11.55)*** 
Dummy 
0.0018 0.0927 0.268 0.0022 0.0857 0.2136 
(5.25)*** (3.21)** (10.25) *** (6.13) *** (2.90)** (5.49)*** 
Adj R-squared 0.368477 0.224003 0.781756 0.8389 0.97207 0.87243 
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Table 3: Multivariate Analysis for Volatility: Individual Quintiles 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2   _     ,it it it it it it itVola Num Trade Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β γ β ε= + + + + +  (1) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVola represents three measurements of volatility including range-based 
volatility, realized volatility and standard deviation of mid-quote prices every fifteen minute; itDummy is 
dummy variable for broker ID opacity taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design change and 1 after the 
event; itTrend is the time variable; _ itNum trade is daily number of trade; and itTotalDepthVal is the daily 
average of total depth in yen. The table contains the stock fixed effect results of OLS and 2SLS regression 
for the full sample with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, the number of trades and total depth 
in yen are treated as endogenous variables while the first and second lagged dependent variables, trend and 
log of market capitalization, are used as instruments. **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 
0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Quintiles 
1 
(Smallest) 
2 3 4 5  
(Largest) 
Panel 1: Log of High-Low Volatility   
  Log of Number of 
Trades 
0.012 0.0128 0.0222 0.0207 0.0175 
(5.89)*** (7.06)*** (11.38)*** (10.28)*** (6.75)*** 
Log of Total Depth in 
Yen 
-0.0019 -0.003 -0.0061 -0.0054 -0.0044 
(-3.47)** (-4.93)*** (-9.39)*** (-9.39)*** (-5.95)*** 
Trend -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00004 
(-9.12)*** (-6.6)*** (-5.75)*** (-5.77)*** (-4.18)*** 
Dummy 0.0054 0.003 0.0011 0.001 0.0005 
(5.52)*** (3.86)*** (1.34) (1.41) (0.69) 
Adj R-squared 0.8474 0.8318 0.8117 0.8367 0.8335 
 
Panel 2: Log of Realized Volatility 
  Log of Number of 
Trades 
0.3763 0.1804 0.3801 0.587 0.3846 
(1.56) (1.0) (1.74) (4.38)*** (0.6) 
Log of Total Depth in 
Yen 
0.1195 0.1727 0.1402 0.0664 0.0616 
(1.89) (2.87)* (1.92) (1.73) (0.34) 
Trend -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0009 
(-0.82) (-0.27) (-1.54) (-2.12)* (-0.72) 
Dummy 0.1516 0.1018 0.0794 0.0089 0.0928 
(1.62) (1.7) (-1.34) (0.29) (1.03) 
Adj R-squared 0.9429 0.97 0.9749 0.9939 0.9668 
 
Panel 3: Log of Standard Deviation of Fifteen-Minute Mid-Quote Prices 
Log of Number of 
Trades 
1.5801 1.8047 3.069 3.1298 2.6895 
(8.37)*** (10.13)*** (10.00)*** (9.74)*** (6.84)*** 
Log of Total Depth in 
Yen 
-0.2928 -0.4384 -0.7329 -0.7912 -0.7383 
(-5.91)*** (-7.39)*** (-7.14)*** (-8.58)*** (-6.6)*** 
Trend -0.0065 -0.0032 -0.0065 -0.0058 -0.005 
(-7.32)*** (-4.25)*** (-5.26)*** (-5.34)*** (-4.51)*** 
Dummy 0.4297 0.236 0.1171 0.2192 0.138 
(5.97)*** (3.61)** (1.18) (2.31)* (1.43) 
Adj R-squared 0.8483 0.9044 0.8336 0.8696 0.9078 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis for Spreads 
The table reports changes in median effective spread and quoted spread for the full stock sample and for five 
size quintiles. The pre-period and post-period are defined as March 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003, and July 1, 
2003 to September 1, 2003, respectively. ‘Difference’ measures changes of absolute and relative spreads 
from the pre-period to the post-period. Each panel presents the analysis for the full sample and for individual 
quintiles. The signed-rank Wilcoxon test examines whether medians change after the broker IDs became 
anonymous and the LOB display was extended to three levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 
1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Quintiles   
  
1 
(smallest) 
2 3 4 5 (largest) Full 
sample 
Panel 1: Closing Quoted Spread (%) 
Pre-Period 0.00504 0.00368 0.00305 0.00283 0.00238 0.00339 
Post-Period 0.00407 0.00333 0.00288 0.00254 0.00236 0.00303 
Difference -0.00097*** -0.00035** -0.00017* -0.00029** -2.00E-05 -0.00036*** 
Panel 2: Equally-Weighted Quoted Spread (%) 
Pre-Period 0.00408 0.00277 0.00233 0.00209 0.00187 0.00262 
Post-Period 0.00324 0.00233 0.00208 0.00177 0.00176 0.00223 
Difference -0.00084*** -0.00044*** -0.00025*** -0.00032*** -0.00011** -0.00039*** 
Panel 3: Time-Weighted Quoted Spread (in percentage) 
Pre-Period 0.01011 0.0073 0.00614 0.00552 0.0048 0.00675 
Post-Period 0.00816 0.00623 0.0054 0.00459 0.00444 0.00574 
Difference -0.00195*** -0.00107*** -0.00074*** -0.00093*** -0.00036** -0.00101*** 
Panel 4: Trade Value-Weighted Effective Spread  
Pre-Period 1.005 1.738 1.381 1.802 2.785 1.736 
Post-Period 1.293 2.013 1.603 1.908 3.113 1.981 
Difference 0.288*** 0.275*** 0.222 0.106*** 0.328*** 0.245*** 
Panel 5: Trade Value-Weighted Effective Spread (in percentage) 
Pre-Period 0.00197 0.00132 0.00112 0.00101 0.00092 0.0013 
Post-Period 0.00157 0.00112 0.001 0.00085 0.00086 0.0011 
Difference -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.00012*** -0.00016*** -0.00006** -0.0002*** 
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Table 5: Fixed Effect Regression Model for Spreads: Full Sample 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it it itSpd Vol Vola Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β γ β ε= + + + + + +   (2) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itSpd is either the quoted spread or the effective spread in percentage and 
local currency; itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the time variable; itDummy is a 
dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design change and 1 after the 
event; and itTotalDepthVal is the daily average of total depth in yen. The table contains the stock fixed 
effect results of OLS and 2SLS regression for the full sample with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 
2SLS, volume, volatility and total depth in yen are treated as endogenous variables, while the first and 
second lagged dependent variables, time trend, log of market capitalization and relative tick size are used as 
instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Fixed effect OLS regression Fixed effect 2SLS regression 
  
Log of 
Trade 
Value-
Weighted 
Effective 
Spread 
(Yen) 
Log of 
Trade 
Value-
Weighted 
Relative 
Effective 
Spread 
(%) 
Log of  
Time-
Weighted 
Quote 
Spread 
(Yen) 
Log of  
Time-
Weighted 
Quote 
Spread 
(%) 
Log of 
Trade 
Value-
Weighted 
Effective 
Spread 
(Yen) 
Log of 
Trade 
Value-
Weighted 
Relative 
Effective 
Spread 
(%) 
Log of 
Time-
Weighted 
Quote 
Spread 
(Yen) 
Log of  
Time-
Weighted 
Quote 
Spread 
(%) 
Log(Volume) -0.0728 -0.0906 -0.073 -0.0898 -0.0653 -2.0255 -0.0108 -1.5072 
(3.64)*** (19.12)*** (13.12)*** (15.74)*** (-1.11) (10.92)*** -0.18 (10.97)*** 
Ln_hi_lo 9.0514 8.6603 5.436 5.0408 30.734 20.4908 24.6588 5.3522 
(16.09)*** (37.98)*** (20.30)*** (18.37)*** (17.09)*** (3.86)*** (11.89)*** -1.18 
Log of Total 
Depth in Yen 
0.0298 0.0348 -0.0476 -0.0423 -0.0031 1.2431 0.0346 0.9242 
(41.58)*** (6.77)*** (7.88)*** (6.84)*** (0.07) (8.64)*** (0.76) (8.68)*** 
Trend 0.0007 -0.001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0008 0.0011 0.0006 0.0005 
(7.12)*** (10.37)*** (7.49)*** (6.90)*** (5.37)*** (2.64)** (3.68)*** (1.49) 
Dummy 0.0106 -0.0289 0.0136 0.0104 0.0194 0.0121 0.0147 0.003 
(1.28) (3.33)*** (1.34) (2.48)* (1.61) (0.34) (1.12) (0.1) 
Adj-R-
squared 0.9602 0.8843 0.9428 0.8063 0.9193 0.9875 0.9764 0.9858 
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Table 6: Fixed Effect Regression Model for Spreads: Individual Quintiles 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it it itSpd Vol Vola Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β γ β ε= + + + + + +   (2) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itSpd is either the quoted spread or the effective spread in percentage and 
local currency; itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the time variable; itDummy is a 
dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design change and 1 after the 
event; and itTotalDepthVal is the daily average of total depth in yen. The table contains the stock fixed 
effect results of OLS and 2SLS regression for the full sample with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 
2SLS, volume, volatility and total depth in yen are treated as endogenous variables, while the first and 
second lagged dependent variables, time trend, log of market capitalization and relative tick size are used as 
instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Quintiles 
  1 (Smallest) 2 3 4 5 (Largest) 
Panel 1: Log of Trade Value-Weighted Effective Spread (in Yen) 
Log(Volume) 0.1263 0.5213 -1.0597 -0.8092 -1.4029 
(2.57)* (2.76)** (-7.67)*** (-0.69) (-0.57) 
Ln_hi_lo 13.3941 14.49 31.3985 63.0442 119.7778 
(5.78)*** (4.1)*** (8.68)*** (2.05)* (1.96) 
Log of Total Depth 
in Yen 
-0.1331 -0.4297 0.7567 0.517 0.992 
(-3.58)** (-2.91)** (8.63)*** (0.64) (0.51) 
Trend 0.0001 -0.0002 0.002 0.0018 0.0025 
(0.25) (-0.44) (4.32)*** (2.01)* (2.06)* 
Dummy 0.06 0.0576 0.0129 -0.0354 -0.0358 
(2.57)* (1.85) (0.34) (-0.82) (-0.46) 
Adj-R-squared 0.9084 0.8962 0.8136 0.8064 0.7264 
Panel 2: Log of Trade Value-Weighted Relative Effective Spread (%) 
Log(Volume) -0.6026 -1.6432 -1.9625 1.6311 8.2222 
(-7.64)*** (-3.63)*** (-7.73)*** (1.17) (0.84) 
Ln_hi_lo 2.2653 -11.1318 11.7016 -81.8092 -31.9802 
(0.68) (-1.45) (1.63) (-1.69) (-0.11) 
Log of Total Depth 
in Yen 
0.0466 0.8522 0.7898 -1.5762 -6.7425 
(0.79) (2.42)* (4.89)*** (-1.63) (-0.87) 
Trend -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0022 
(-0.75) (-0.94) (3.42)*** (-0.83) (-0.35) 
Dummy 0.0507 0.0582 0.0097 -0.0694 -0.0293 
(1.42) (0.77) (0.13) (-0.95) (-0.07) 
Adj-R-squared 0.8062 0.8771 0.8471 0.8676 0.8415 
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  Quintiles 
  1 (Smallest) 2 3 4 5 (Largest) 
Panel 3: Log of Time-Weighted Quote Spread (in Yen) 
Log(Volume) 0.1546 0.0992 -0.9928 -1.2892 -3.9536 
(3.00)** (0.82) (-6.87)*** (-1.95) (-0.63) 
Ln_hi_lo 6.9773 6.3045 31.3582 74.5239 71.6524 
(2.71)** (2.43)* (7.75)*** (4.36)*** (0.52) 
Log of Total Depth 
in Yen 
-0.0272 0.0116 0.8209 0.9535 3.0918 
(-0.7) (0.12) (9.01)*** (2.07)* (0.62) 
Trend -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0018 0.0019 0.0028 
(-2.41)* (-0.55) (3.57)*** (2.49)* (1.03) 
Dummy 0.0887 0.0806 -0.0131 -0.0325 -0.0724 
(3.7)*** (3.26)** (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.42) 
Adj-R-squared 0.9718 0.9807 0.9475 0.917 0.7121 
Panel 4: Log of  Time-Weighted Quote Spread (%) 
Log(Volume) -0.5621 -1.256 -1.3061 -8.1185 7.4677 
(6.93)*** (-3.92)*** (-7.58)*** (-1.12) (0.44) 
Ln_hi_lo -5.5688 -19.1109 7.1816 169.6662 -86.9049 
(-1.51) (-2.87)** (1.40) (0.91) (-0.31) 
Log of Total Depth 
in Yen 
0.1452 0.6667 0.4854 5.3082 -6.0433 
(2.39)** (2.66)** (4.47)*** (1.05) (-0.46) 
Trend -0.001 -0.0011 0.002 0.005 -0.0024 
(-2.4)* (-1.56) (3.20)** (0.90) (-0.39) 
Dummy 0.0733 0.0592 -0.0138 -0.0376 -0.0776 
(2.01)* (0.93) (-0.27) (-0.14) (-0.23) 
Adj-R-squared 0.9951 0.9824 0.9602 0.7941 0.8037 
 
 
  
35 
 
Table 7: Univariate Analysis for Market Depth 
The table reports the changes in median eight depth measurements for the full stocks and five size quintiles. 
The pre-period and post-period are defined as March 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003, and July 1, 2003 to 
September 1, 2003, respectively. ‘Difference’ measures the change of eight market depth proxies from the 
pre-period to the post-period. Each panel presents the analysis for the full sample and the top, middle and 
bottom individual quintiles. The signed-rank Wilcoxon test examines whether medians change after the 
concealment of broker identity and extension of the LOB. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% 
and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Group 
  1 (smallest) 2 3 (largest) All Stocks 
Panel 1: Best Depth by Size 
Pre-Period 385541.228 40094.11 50245.309 158626.882 
Post-Period 297889.828 41107.276 59709.452 129977.615 
Difference -87651.4* 1013.166 9464.143 -28649.267 
Panel 2: Total Depth by Size 
Pre-Period 1076687.394 125272.387 153797.262 451919.015 
Post-Period 977401.383 124506.625 182593.799 418522.112 
Difference -99286.011 -765.762 28796.537 -33396.903 
Panel 3: Ratio Bid Depth by Size 
Pre-Period 0.309 0.318 0.314 0.314 
Post-Period 0.303 0.313 0.31 0.308 
Difference -0.006 -0.005* -0.004 -0.006* 
Panel 4: Ratio Ask Depth by Size 
Pre-Period 0.315 0.323 0.319 0.319 
Post-Period 0.307 0.32 0.322 0.317 
Difference -0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 
Panel 5: Best Depth by Value 
Pre-Period 40,603,214.64 20,731,463.15 58,276,894.22 39,870,524 
Post-Period 44,413,817.66 25,424,450.87 77,906,801.80 48,997,167.11 
Difference 3,810,603.023* 4,692,987.719*** 19629907.58** 9126643.109** 
Panel 6: Total Depth by Value 
Pre-Period 112,858,693.70 62,957,019.58 178,889,813.10 118,235,175.50 
Post-Period 142,868,938.30 75,712,913.36 237,294,220.50 151,106,436.10 
Difference 30,010,244.62* 12,755,893.78*** 58,404,407.46** 32,871,260.61** 
Panel 7: Ratio Bid Depth by Value 
Pre-Period 0.31 0.319 0.315 0.314 
Post-Period 0.303 0.313 0.31 0.309 
Difference -0.007 -0.006* -0.005 -0.005* 
Panel 8: Ratio Ask Depth by Value 
Pre-Period 0.314 0.323 0.319 0.318 
Post-Period 0.306 0.32 0.322 0.316 
Difference -0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 
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Table 8: Regression Model for Depth: Full Sample 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it itDepthVal LogVol Vola Trend Dummyα β β β β ε= + + + + +  (3) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the time 
variable; itDummy is a dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design 
change and 1 after the event; and itDepthVal is the daily average of total depth and the best depth in yen. 
The table presents the OLS and 2SLS regression results with fixed effect approach for the full sample, with 
t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, the volume and volatility are treated as endogenous 
variables while the first lagged dependent variable, logarithm of market capitalization and time trend are 
used as instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
  Fixed effect OLS regression Fixed effect 2SLS regression 
  Log of Total Depth  in Yen 
Log of Best 
Depth in Yen 
Log of Total 
Depth in Yen 
Log of Best 
Depth in Yen 
Log of Volume 0.5441 0.5652 1.3354 1.2471 
(80.33)*** (67.74)*** (179.25)*** (175.89)*** 
Ln_hi_lo -16.072 -14.7819 -74.7673 -55.0283 
(42.71)*** (31.89)*** (8.41)*** (6.53)*** 
Trend 0.0013 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0018 
(7.31)*** (2.99)** (5.06)*** (6.02)*** 
Dummy -0.033 0.1464 -0.007 0.1688 
(2.15)* (7.74)*** (-0.25) (6.49)*** 
Adj R-squared 0.8818 0.8271 0.9988 0.9989 
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Table 9: Regression Model for Depth: Individual Quintiles 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 2 3      ,it it it it it it itDepthVal LogVol Vola Trend Dummyα β β β β ε= + + + + +  (3) 
where for each stock i  at day t , itVol is daily volume; itVola is high-low volatility; itTrend is the time 
variable; itDummy is a dummy variable for broker ID opacity, taking the value 0 prior to the TSE design 
change and 1 after the event; and itDepthVal is the daily average of total depth and the best depth in yen. 
The table presents the OLS and 2SLS regression results with fixed effect approach for the full sample, with 
t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, the volume and volatility are treated as endogenous 
variables while the first lagged dependent, logarithm of market capitalization and trend are used as 
instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
  Quintiles 
  1 (Smallest) 2 3 4 5 (Largest) 
Panel1: Log of Total Depth in Yen 
Log of Volume 1.6557 1.3142 1.6337 1.4361 1.387 
(10.48)*** (52.26)*** (65.63)*** (154.79)*** (31.07)*** 
Ln_hi_lo -206.76 -15.241 -28.3606 -36.8877 -144.415 
(-2.10)* (-0.97) (-2.32)* (-3.0)** (-2.42)* 
Trend -0.0047 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0004 -0.0029 
(-1.6) (-1.54) (-4.92)*** (-0.76) (-2.21)* 
Dummy -0.141 -0.0192 0.0741 -0.0523 0.0677 
(-0.71) (-0.41) (1.26) (-1.07) (0.71) 
Adj R-squared 0.8219 0.8882 0.8533 0.8766 0.8452 
Panel 2: Log of Best Depth in Yen 
Log of Volume 1.5885 1.258 1.4696 1.3162 1.2123 
(10.31)*** (44.52)*** (51.31)*** (122.71)*** (45.81)*** 
Ln_hi_lo -216.985 -29.6659 4.488 -5.9094 -10.4412 
(-2.26)* (-1.6) (0.32) (-0.41) (-0.29) 
Trend -0.0047 -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0015 
(-1.57) (-2.53)* (-3.91)*** (-0.15) (-1.84) 
Dummy -0.0455 0.1745 0.2237 0.107 0.2373 
(-0.22) (3.6)** (3.5)** (1.97)* (3.98)*** 
Adj R-squared 0.8063 0.8782 0.8484 0.8695 0.8422 
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Table 10: Univariate Analysis for Trading Volume 
The table reports the changes in median trading volume for the full stocks and five size quintiles. The pre-
period and post-period are defined as March 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003, and July 1, 2003 to September 1, 
2003, respectively. Difference measures changes of volume from the pre-period to the post-period. Each row 
presents the analysis for the full sample and the top, middle and bottom individual quintiles. The signed-rank 
Wilcoxon test examines whether medians change after the concealment of broker ID and extension of the 
LOB. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Pre-Period Post-Period Difference 
    
Group 1 1291747 2744450 1452703*** 
Group 2 1311706 1972201 660494.9*** 
Group 3 1377484 2191674 814189.98*** 
Group 4 2329665 3208162 878497.16*** 
Group 5 2825095 3714367 889272.02*** 
Full sample 1817764 2752081 934317.52*** 
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Table 11: Regression Model for Trading Volume: Full Sample 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 , 1 2 3 4 5       ,  it it i t it it it it it it itVol Vol Spd Vola Mcap Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β β β γ β ε−= + + + + + + + +   
(4)  
where all variables are defined in the previous tables; the table presents the OLS and 2SLS regression results 
with fixed effect approach for the individual quintiles with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, 
the volume and volatility are treated as endogenous variables while the first lagged dependent, logarithm of 
market capitalization and trend are used as instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 
0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Fixed Effect OLS 
regression 
Fixed Effect 2SLS 
regression 
Log of Trade Volume 
Lag of Log(Volume) 0.2815  
(43.69)***  
Log of Relative Effective 
Spread 
-0.2693 -0.0304 
(16.09)*** (1.52) 
Ln_hi_lo 22.1524 50.8503 
(58.42)*** (5.02)*** 
Log of MCap -0.035  
(1.09)  
Log of Total Depth in Yen 0.5431 0.629 
(71.45)*** (10.35)*** 
Trend 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.94) (1.84) 
Dummy 0.0303 0.0613 
(1.98)* (3.15)** 
Adj R-squared 0.93 0.99 
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Table 12: Regression Model for Trading Volume: Individual Quintiles 
This table reports the results of regressions of the form: 
1 , 1 2 3 4 5       ,  it it i t it it it it it it itVol Vol Spd Vola Mcap Trend TotalDepthVal Dummyα β β β β β γ β ε−= + + + + + + + +
             (4) 
where all variables are defined in the previous tables; the table presents the OLS and 2SLS regression results 
with fixed effect approach for the individual quintiles with t -statistics in parentheses. In fixed effect 2SLS, 
the volume and volatility are treated as endogenous variables while the first lagged dependent, logarithm of 
market capitalization and trend are used as instruments. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 
0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Quintiles 
1 (Smallest) 2 3 4 5 (Largest) 
Log of Relative Effective 
Spread 
3.2904 2.7634 22.4658 1.4853 -2.703 
(1.47) (0.40) (0.21) (1.29) (-0.25) 
Ln_hi_lo 67.379 18.5121 266.7126 35.5743 48.0802 
(2.35)* (0.16) (0.29) (1.19) (0.66) 
Log of Total Depth in 
Yen 
1.3772 1.1516 8.0259 0.9886 0.0683 
(1.79) (1.09) (-0.24) (-0.28)* (0.03) 
Trend 0.0005 -0.001 -0.0088 0.000023 0.0011 
(0.33) (-0.26) (-0.18) (4.26)*** (0.16) 
Dummy 0.0679 0.0815 0.0401 0.0115 0.09 
(0.65) (1.23) (0.06) (0.03) (1.51) 
Adj R-squared 0.9954 0.9973 0.8096 0.9988 0.9988 
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Table 13: Robustness Checks using Daily Post-period Dummy variables 
This table reports the robustness checks results for volatility, spreads, depths and trading volume in the 
following form:  
1 1
_    ,  
n m
k j
it k it j it it
k j
Mkt Quality Intercept Post period ControlVariableβ θ ε
= =
= + − + +∑ ∑ (5) 
where 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 are the three measures of volatility - range-based volatility; realized volatility; and 
standard deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices; the two relative spread metrics – effective and quoted 
spreads; the two depth measurement – the daily average of total depth and the best depth in yen; and daily 
trading volume, respectively. We control for cross-correlation by introducing n dummy variables 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 −
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑘 , which equal one for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ day in the n-day post-event period and is zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑗  is the same set of m control variables used in Equations (1), (2),  (3) and (4)  for analysis 
of volatility, spreads, depths and trading volume, respectively. We allow for stock-fixed effect intercept. We 
report the median of the dummy variables’ coefficients (𝛽𝑘𝑠) and the 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (in parentheses) of the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of a zero median. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Median p-Value of Wilcoxon 
Test   (n = 63) 
Panel A: Analysis of Volatility Estimated from Multivariate Regressions using Daily Post-period Dummy variables 
   Ln_hi_lo 0.0020*** (0.0000) 
Log of Realized Volatility 0.0069*** (0.0000) 
Log of Standard deviation 15’ 0.2855*** (0.0000) 
   Panel B: Analysis of Spreads Estimated from Multivariate Regressions using Daily Post-period Dummy variables 
   Log of Trade Value-Weighted Relative Effective Spread (%) 0.0031 (0.8870) 
Log of Time-Weighted Quote Spread (%) -0.0066 (0.7659) 
   Panel C: Analysis of Depths Estimated from Multivariate Regressions using Daily Post-period Dummy variables 
   Log of Total Depth in Yen -0.0010*** (0.0000) 
Log of Best Depth in Yen 0.0100*** (0.0000) 
 
Panel D: Analysis of Volume Estimated from Multivariate Regressions using Daily Post-period Dummy variables 
   
Log of Trade Volume 0.0540*** (0.0006) 
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Appendix: Unit root tests 
 
We implement Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003 ) unit root tests including and excluding time trend for our unbalanced panel datasets to examine whether our series contains 
unit roots. The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit roots and the alternative is that some panels are stationary. The test involves fitting an augmented Dickey–
Fuller regression for each panel; we requested that the number of lags to include be selected based on the AIC with at most 8 lags. The test results are presented in the 
following table. **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
 
Number 
of panels 
Average 
number of 
periods Variables 
Statistics 
With trend Without trend 
99 122.74 High-low volatility -84.5655*** -78.9300*** 
99 122.73 Logarithm of realized volatility -29.2548*** -31.0323*** 
99 122.55 Logarithm of standard deviation of fifteen-minute mid-quote prices -75.6872 *** -64.8614*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of Volume -50.5913*** -42.7786*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of traded value weighted relative effective spreads -43.4631*** -39.7691*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of traded value weighted effective spreads -78.2894*** -75.3358*** 
99 122.54 Logarithm of time weighted quoted spreads -80.5986*** -72.0409*** 
99 122.54 Logarithm of time weighted relative quoted spreads -52.7918*** -45.7925*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of total depth value -48.8805*** -40.2526*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of best depth value -59.2071*** -41.2434*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of trade size -69.2538*** -60.8810*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of market capitalization -5.5449*** -9.0776*** 
99 122.74 Logarithm of relative tick size -50.7876*** -46.3972*** 
99 122.74 Relative tick size -53.8848*** -46.2257*** 
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